Reliance Jio and the Transformation of the Indian Telecom Industry: An Analytical Approach to Predatory Pricing Charges

Authors

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.65021/mwsj.v2.i2.42

Keywords:

competition policy, industrial organization, market structure, predatory pricing, telecommunications economics

Abstract

Literature concerning the disruptive entry of Reliance Jio in India's telecommunications sector often does not measure the effect against the standard for predatory pricing, namely below-cost pricing along with an opportunity of recoupment within a legal-economic framework. This study measures whether Jio's behavior can be considered either disruptive competition or predatory pricing in an evolving industry structure by conducting a doctrinal and qualitative analysis of Competition Commission of India (CCI) orders, peer-reviewed papers and legal literature, and industry statistics from 2016-2025 through the use of the Areeda-Turner cost test and recoupment under competition law standards. The quantitative variables of subscriber base, market share, revenue of the sector, and exits of operators are tested together with the liberalization of interconnection charges, change in spectrum policy, and reductions in costs of handsets. While there is ample evidence of disruption and exit of competitors, there is not enough evidence of below-cost pricing and its success of recoupment, which is consistent with CCI's failure to establish both dominance and predatory pricing by Jio. The contribution of this research paper lies in the reframing of the Jio story from the perspective of the effectiveness of India’s dominance-based strategy in predatory pricing as compared to its treatment as a classic example of predatory pricing. The negative impact of predatory pricing on competitors is evaluated in terms of consumer welfare and digital inclusion.

Downloads

Download data is not yet available.

Author Biographies

  • Anand Sagar Soni, Vivekananda Global University

    PhD Scholar, Department of Economics, Vivekananda Global University, Jaipur, India. Research interests include Economic Studies and Development Studies.

  • Aman Kumar Buri, NIMS University

    Assistant Professor, Department of Law, S.S. Jain Subodh Law College, Jaipur, India. Research interests include Constitutional Law and Competition Law.

References

1. Areeda, P. E., & Turner, D. F. (1975). Predatory pricing and related practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. Harvard Law Review, 88(4), 697–733. https://doi.org/10.2307/1340237

2. Bhatia, J., & Palepu, A. R. (2016). Reliance Jio: Predatory pricing or predatory behaviour? Economic and Political Weekly, 51(39).

https://www.epw.in/journal/2016/39/web-exclusives/reliance-jio-predatory-pricing-or-predatory-behaviour.html

3. Bhattacharjea, A. (2018). Predatory pricing in platform competition: Economic theory and Indian cases. In A. Bharadwaj, V. H. Devaiah, & I. Gupta (Eds.), Multi-dimensional approaches towards new technology: Insights on innovation, patents and competition (pp. 211-230). Springer.

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-13-1232-8_11

4. Bolton, P., & Scharfstein, D. S. (1990). A theory of predation based on agency problems in financial contracting. The American Economic Review, 80(1), 93-106.

https://business.columbia.edu/sites/default/files-efs/pubfiles/2019/theory%20of%20predation.pdf

5. Competition Commission of India. (2017). Bharti Airtel Limited v. Reliance Industries Limited & Reliance Jio Infocomm Limited (Case No. 03 of 2017).

https://www.cci.gov.in/images/antitrustorder/en/0320171652338122.pdf

6. Competition Commission of India. (2017). Fast Track Call Cab Pvt. Ltd. & Meru Travel Solutions Pvt. Ltd. v. ANI Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Case Nos. 06 & 74 of 2015).

https://www.cci.gov.in/images/antitrustorder/en/62015-and-7420151652259825.pdf

7. Competition Commission of India. (n.d.). Provisions relating to abuse of dominance (Advocacy Series 4). Government of India.

https://www.cci.gov.in/public/images/publications_booklet/en/provisions-relating-to-abuse-of-dominance1652177254.pdf

8. Daga, T., Chandra, V., & Malik, A. (2018). Effect of Reliance Jio on Digital India. International Journal of Advanced Research, 6(6), 395-401. https://doi.org/10.21474/IJAR01/7224

9. Dixit, A. (1980). The Role of Investment in Entry-Deterrence. The Economic Journal, 90(357), 95.

https://doi.org/10.2307/2231658

10. Doval, P., & Zachariah, R. (2017, October 13). Tata Teleservices merges with Airtel to manage debt of Rs 40,000 crore. The Times of India.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/tatas-exit-mobile-biz-merge-loss-making-unit-with-airtel/articleshow/61060247.cms

11. High Level Committee on Competition Law and Policy. (2000). Report of the High Level Committee on Competition Law and Policy (S. V. S. Raghavan, Chair). Department of Company Affairs, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India.

https://the1991project.com/public-repository/report-high-level-committee-competition-law-and-policy-2000-chaired-s-v-s

12. HRK News Bureau. (2018, September 6). Vodafone-Idea merger: Loss of jobs for thousands. HR Katha.

https://www.hrkatha.com/news/vodafone-idea-merger-loss-of-jobs-for-thousands/

13. Kreps, D. M., & Wilson, R. (1982). Reputation and imperfect information. Journal of Economic Theory, 27(2), 253-279. https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8

14. Madaan, M., & Mohanty, A. (2025). Abuse of dominant position in the light of the Reliance Jio case. ResearchGate.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/392434879_Abuse_of_Dominant_Position_in_the_light_of_the_Reliance_Jio_Case

15. Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1982). Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis. Econometrica, 50(2), 443. https://doi.org/10.2307/1912637

16. Mishra, T., & Biswal, P. S. (2022). Case analysis of Bharti Airtel Ltd. v. Reliance Industries Ltd. and Reliance Jio Infocom Ltd. Indian Journal of Integrated Research in Law, 2(5), 1-9.

https://ijirl.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/09/CASE-ANALYSIS-OF-BHARTI-AIRTEL-LTD-V-RELIANCE-INDUSTRIES-LTD-AND-RELIANCE-JIO-INFOCOM-LTD.pdf

17. Newsclick Report. (2018, April 30). Downswing continues in the Indian telecom sector, about 90,000 job cuts expected this year. NewsClick.

https://www.newsclick.in/downswing-continues-indian-telecom-sector-about-90000-job-cuts-expected-year

18. Pandey, N., & Kumar, A. (2018). Responding to 4G telecom pricing war: Ignore, accommodate or retaliate. Emerald Emerging Markets Case Studies, 8(2), 1-23. https://doi.org/10.1108/EEMCS-11-2017-0251

19. Press Trust of India. (2017, April 8). Telcos' consumer service revenue dips 10.5% in December quarter: TRAI. NDTV Profit.

https://www.ndtvprofit.com/business/telcos-consumer-service-revenue-dips-10-5-in-december-quarter-trai-1678870-10849915

20. Press Trust of India. (2019, May 9). Anil Ambani-led RCom’s bankruptcy process begins; next hearing on May 30. The Times of India.

https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/india-business/anil-ambanis-rcoms-bankruptcy-begins-next-hearing-on-may-30/articleshow/69250601.cms

21. Raychaudhuri, T. (2020). Abuse of dominance in digital platforms: An analysis of Indian competition jurisprudence. Competition Commission of India Journal on Competition Law and Policy, 1, 1-27.

https://doi.org/10.54425/ccijoclp.v1.5

22. Reliance Industries Limited. (2017). Integrated annual report 2016-17: Life is beautiful. Life is digital.

https://www.ril.com/ar2016-17/pdf/RIL-Integrated-AR-2016-17.pdf

23. Saxena, H., & Rathore, N. (2020). Challenging the competition precedent: A critical analysis of the Competition Commission decision on Bharti Airtel Ltd. vs. Reliance Industries Ltd. & Anr. International Journal of Law Management & Humanities, 3(6), 103-113.

https://ijlmh.com/wp-content/uploads/Challenging-the-Competition-Precedent.pdf?pdf=1

24. Sengupta, D. (2018, February 28). Aircel files for bankruptcy in NCLT, Mumbai. ETTelecom.com.

https://telecom.economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/aircel-to-file-for-bankruptcy/63110103

25. Shanmugam, C., & Gandhi, M. (2017, August). C Shanmugam and Manish Gandhi vs. Reliance Jio Infocomm Ltd, DoT, TRAI and BSNL (Analysis of Competition Cases in India, Edition No. 6). CUTS International. https://cuts-ccier.org/pdf/Edition-6-Analysis_of_Competition_Cases_in_India.pdf

26. Singh, A. K., & Kulhari, D. (2022). Addressing competition concerns in Big Data. Journal of Legal Studies & Research, 8(1), 193-207. https://journal.thelawbrigade.com/jlsr/article/view/1306

27. Singh, R., & Srivastava, A. (2017). Impact of Reliance Jio on telecom industry of India. International Journal of Innovative Research in Engineering & Multidisciplinary Physical Sciences, 5(6), 1-4.

https://www.ijirmps.org/papers/2017/6/369.pdf

28. Spence, A. M. (1977). Entry, Capacity, Investment and Oligopolistic Pricing. The Bell Journal of Economics, 8(2), 534. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003302

29. Taneja, M. (2018, September 7). Reliance Jio impact: 15,000 people lost jobs, just 3 companies left in 2 years. Zee Business.

https://www.zeebiz.com/india/news-reliance-jio-impact-15000-people-lost-jobs-just-3-companies-left-in-2-years-62410

30. The Economic Times. (2018, March 8). NCLT approves Airtel-Telenor merger. The Economic Times.

https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/nclt-approves-airtel-telenor-merger/articleshow/63220371.cms

31. Tiwari, A. (2018, May 4). How the great Indian telecom revolution turned into a tragedy of losses and job cuts. DailyO.

https://www.dailyo.in/business/telecom-industry-spectrum-job-losses-telecom-revolution-idea-cellular-bharti-airtel-reliance-jio-23882

Downloads

Published

2026-08-17

Issue

Section

Articles

How to Cite

Reliance Jio and the Transformation of the Indian Telecom Industry: An Analytical Approach to Predatory Pricing Charges. (2026). Milky Way Scientific Journal, 2(2), 173-183. https://doi.org/10.65021/mwsj.v2.i2.42